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VOLUME 16 JANUARY, 1932 No. 2
THE DOUBLE HAZARD OF A NOTE AND MORTGAGE
By G. W. C. Ross *
M R. BORROWER borrows money from Mr. Lender and
gives the latter his negotiable promissory note, and a real
estate mortgage to secure it. Does he thereby put himself in
jeopardy of having to pay the money and also lose his land? He
may do things later that will entail that hazard, but does he incur
it at the outset, by giving his note and mortgage? It would seem
obvious that the answer must be negative. Paying the note, B
rightfully expects the mortgage to be discharged; B failing to pay
the note, L or his successor in interest may take the land by fore-
closure. "The note and mortgage are inseparable, the former as
essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note
carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter
alone is a nullity," I or at most, conveys only a "'dry trust." Pay-
ment of the debt, even after maturity, extinguishes the mortgage
lien without formal re-conveyance or satisfaction executed by the
mortgagee." Minnesota has gone further than some states in
holding the note and mortgage separate contracts, more or less
independently enforceable. Contrary to the Uniform Mortgage
Act, sec. 6,-not yet law in Minnesota '--and to the federal
court rule,' the Minnesota court has persistently held a mortgage
*Professor of Law, St. Thomas College, St. Paul, Minn.
:Carpenter v. Longan, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 271, 274. 21 L. Ed. 313
2Carpenter v. Longan, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 271, 275-76. 21 L. Ed.
313. Cf. Merritt v. Bartholick, (1867) 36 N. Y. 44: Morris v. Bacon.
(1877) 123 Mass. 58; Wilson v. Eigenbrodt, (1882) 30 Minn. 4. 13 N. \V.
907; Rigney v. Lovejoy, (1842) 13 N. H. 247; Wolcott v. Winchester.
(1860) 15 Gray (Mass.) 461. Many similar statements will be found
in cases cited in following footnotes. So an assignee of the debt has the
benefit of the mortgage though he did not know of it: (semble) Edwards
v. Bay State Gas Co., (C.C. Del. 1911) 184 Fed. 979. 982. Cf. First
Nat'l Bank v. Pope, (1902) 85 Minn. 433, 89 N. W. 318. Sed. Cf.
Franklin Say. Bank v. Colby, (1898) 105 Iowa 424, 75 N. V. 346.
sExcept that Part III of the Uniform Act has just been (substantially)
enacted by the Minnesota Legislature as a "Short Form Mortgage Act:"
Minn. Laws 1931, ch. 204.4Carpenter v. Longan, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 271, 274. 21 .. Ed. 313.
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non-negotiable, even when it secures a negotiable note.' The note,
however, is negotiable, though it is secured by a mortgage and
discloses that fact upon its face.0  And the note's reciting the
fact of its mortgage security does not import the terms of the
mortgage into the note. That remains negotiable, though the
mortgage contains stipulations that would destroy the note's ne-
gotiability if it immediately contained them.' In King Cattle Co.
v. Joseph s our court held that if the note not simply recites the
existence of the mortgage but goes on to make its own terms
expressly "subject to" the provisions of the mortgage, that will
import the conditions of the mortgage into the note. The deci-
sion was promptly overruled by the legislature," indicating (per-
haps) a feeling among Minnesota lawyers and business men that
a note ought to he negotiable no matter what it says about the
mortgage. In all these rules Minnesota seems more or less pe-
culiar. But they are not supposed to impair the basic insepara-
bility of the two instruments, and it is not believed that they
control the present inquiry.'
After taking the note and mortgage, suppose L "in due
course" endorses and delivers the note to X. X thereby becomes
"equitable" owner of the mortgage, but, in Minnesota at least, L
5johnson v. Carpenter, (1862) 7 Minn. 176 (Gil. 120) Paulson v.
Koon. (1902) 85 Minn. 240. 88 N. W. 760; Johnson v. Flowe. (1929)
176 Minn. 287. 223 N. W. 148. Cf. Burhans v. Hutcheson, (1881) 25 Kan.
625. 629. 631: Lewis v. Kirk. (1882) 28 Kan. 497. 500-502. 506: The W. B.
Cole. (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1893) 59 Fed. 182. Cf. Britton. Assignment of
Mortgages Securing Negotiable Notes, (1915) 10 11I. L. Rev. 337.
GBlumenthal v. Jassoy, (1882) 29 Minn. 177, 12 N. V. 517. Cf.
Snelling St. Bank v. Clasen. (1916) 132 Minn. 404. 157 N. W. 043:
Loring v. Swanson. (1930) 180 Minn. 104. 108, 230 N. W. 277; Watkins
v. Goessler. (1896) 65 Minn. 118. 119. 76 N. W. 796: Allen v. Cooling.
(1924) 161 Minn. 10. 15. 16, 200 N. W. 849; Int. Fin. Co. v. N. W. Drug
Co.. (D.C. Minn. 1922) 282 Fed. 920
7White v. Miller. (1893) 52 Minn. 367, 54 N. W. 736: Burnside v.
Craig. (1918) 140 Minn. 404. 168 N. W. 175: Winne v. Lahart, (1923)
155 Minn. 307. 193 N. W. 587: Jordan v. Flour City Co.. (1924) 159
Minn. 518, 199 N. W. 231. Cf. Garnett v. Meyers, (1902) 65 Neb. 280.
284-5. 288 et seq.. 91 N. W. 400, (1903) 94 N. W. 803: Roblee v. Union
Stockyds. Bank. (1903) 69 Neb. 180. 95 N. W. 61.
8(1924) 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. "A. 798, 199 N. W. 437.
O'Minn. Laws 1927, ch. 416. While this statute applies to all promissory
contracts secured by mortgage or trust deed, it affects only such as are
certified or authenticated by the mortgagee, trustee or a registry agent.
Apparently the decision (King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, (1924) 158 Minn.
481. 198 N. W. 798, (1924) 199 N. W. 437) would still control the case of a
"plain note" secured by direct mortgage, where the note does not bear
the authenticating counter-signature of the mortgagee.
lOCf. McManaman v. Hinckley, (1901) 82 Minn. 296. 297-8, 84 N. W.
1018.
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retains "what may be called the legal title to the mortgage,""
From this point on, if L is dishonest he can do several things to
cause complications. Perhaps the most common occurrence is
that L accepts payment from B and keeps the money, B not know-
ing the note has been transferred. Where the mortgage par-
takes of the note's negotiability, B will have to pay again, to X;
else, X will get judgment for the money and foreclosure of the
mortgage.12 This subjects B to double liability. He must pay
twice; or, having paid once, also lose his land by foreclosure. But
this result he brought upon himself, not just by giving the note
and mortgage, but by the circumstances of his later payment. By
paying L without requiring surrender of his note he paid at his
own risk."3  But Minnesota holds that by so paying L, B dis-
charged the mortgage lien. though he is still personally liable to X
on the note." For the redemption of his land from the mortgage
lien. B need make no inquiry as to L's right to receive payment.
He need not see nor ask for the note, nor even obtain a record-
able satisfaction of the mortgage. Still, he will be held to have
paid L in "good faith." and the mortgage lien is extinguished."
Indeed, even if X held not only the note, but also a formal, re-
corded assignment of the mortgage. still, under the Minne-
sota statute.16 B. blindly paying L without production of the
note or inquiry, will have freed his land from the mortgage lien.
Where it is not B himself, but his grantee of the land, that
pays L, many decisions hold such grantee to the same risk as B
himself. He must at his peril ascertain L's right to receive pay-
ment. But other opinions point out that the grantee did not make
"Mitchell, J., in Burke v. Backus. (1892) 51 Minn. 174. 178. 53
N. W. 458.2Carpenter v. Longan, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 271: Burhan, '.
Hutcheson. (1881) 25 Kan. 625: Livermore v. Maxwell. (1893) 87 Iowia
705. 711-12. 715-16, 55 N. W. 37: Keohane v. Smith. (1880) 97 Ill. I5'):
Hollinshead v. Stuart Co., (1898) 8 N. D. 35. 40. 77 N. V. 89. 91:
Murphy v. Barnard, (1894) 162 Mass. 72, 77-81. 38 N. F. -9. Cf.
Eggert v. Beyer, (1895) 43 Neb. 711. 716 et seq.. 62 N. W. 57. Sed. Cf.
McKinley Co. v. Gordon. (1901) 113 Iowa 481. 484, 85 N. W. 816.
131n Kellogg v. Smith. (1862) 26 N. Y. 18. Allen J.. diss.. urged(in a somewhat different connection) that where the note is asked for and
not produced, but a false though plausible excuse is given and relied on.
the party inquiring ought not to be held at risk of the falsity of the excuse.
But a majority of the court did not agree. The risk is absolute. If only
part nayment is made. of course surrender of the note cannot be re-
quired. But its production can be. and an "endorsement" of the payment
upon it Cf. Note 38. post.
14Redin v. Branhan. (1890) 43 Minn. 283. 45 N. W. 445. Cf. Notes 5
and 6, ante: Allen v. Waddle, (1922) 111 Kan. 690, 208 Pac. 551.
'
5Sed Cf. Merchant v. Woods, (1881) 27 Minn. 396. 7 N. W. 826:
Cf. Notes 44, 46, 47, 48, post.16Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 8225. The same statute is found in other states.
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the note and it is not to be surrendered to him, and hence urge
that he should be under no burden of inquiry about it, but should
be able safely to pay L as record holder of the mortgage and dis-
charge the land from its lien. This is particularly cogent if the
grantee did not assume the mortgage debt, or if he acquired from
B only part of the mortgaged land and is interested to obtain
only a "partial release" of the mortgage."I
Suppose (the note having been transferred to X in due
course) B pays L and obtains from him a formal, recorded satis-
faction of the mortgage; later, B sells and conveys the land to Y,
who buys "on the record," making no inquiry beyond or outside
it. Courts early found this situation difficult. On the principle
that transfer of the debt carries the mortgage, it has been held
that the assignment of a mortgage is not within the purview of
the recording acts; or, that while a recorded assignment might be
requisite to protect the assignee against a future purchaser of the
mortgage, no formal assignment was necessary to his rights
against a future purchaser of the land.'8 But such a doctrine
could not last, and Y now is generally protected. 19 Buying in
reliance on the satisfaction of record, he need not get or see the
note, nor ask whether it was surrendered to B. Sometimes,
however, the satisfaction is delivered to Y or is given in connec-
"7Distinction may be drawn between a direct mortgage and a niort-
gage in the form of a trust deed; also, between payment made before
maturity and payment at or after maturity. Cf. Note 12, ante; Wolcott
v. Winchester, (1860) 15 Gray (Mass.) 461 ; Shoemaker v. Minkler, (1926)
202 Iowa 942, 211 N. W. 563; Marling v. Jones, (1909) 138 Wis. 82, 91-2.
119 N. W. 931, 934-5. Cf. Carleton College v. McNaughton. (1879) 26
Minn. 194, 2 N. W. 688. In one respect B's grantee pays L at greater
risk than B himself. The statute last cited (Minn. G.S. 1923, sec. 8225)
authorizes B to pay L in the teeth of a recorded assignment of the mort-
gage, but that protection is not extended to B's grantee.
'$Purdy v. Huntington, (1870) 42 N. Y. 334.
19Cf. Van Keuren v. Corkins, (1876) 66 N. Y. 77: Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Huntington, (1897) 57 Kan. 744. 48 Pac. 19; Whipple v. Fowler,(1894) 41 Neb. 675, 60 N. W. 15; Bullock v. Pock, (1899) 57 Neb. 781,
78 N. W. 261; Demuth v. Old Town Bank, (1897) 85 Md. 315, 323. 325,
327, 37 Atl. 266; Reeves v. Hayes, (1884) 95 Ind. 521; Conn. Mut. Co.
v. Talbot, (1887) 113 Ind. 373, 14 N. E. 586; Nat'l Livestock Bank of
Chicago v. First Nat'l Bank, (1906) 203 U. S. 296, 27 Sup. Ct. 79, 51
L. Ed. 192; Black v. Reno (C.C. Mo. 1894) 59 Fed. 917; Lee v. Clark,
(1886) 89 Mo. 553, 1 S. W. 142; Bamberger v. Geiser, (1893) 24 Or.
203, 33 Pac. 609; Vann v. Marbury, (1893) 100 Ala. 438, 14 So. 273; Fed.
Land Bank v. Branscomb, (1925) 213 Ala. 567, 105 So. 585; Delta
County Co. v. Talcott, (1902) 17 Colo. App. 316, 68 Pac. 985; Swasey v.
Emerson, (1897) 168 Mass. 118, 46 N. E. 426; Merrill v. Hurley, (1895)
6 S. D. 592, 605, 62 N. W. 958; Pickford v. Peebles, (1895) 7 S. D. 166,
63 N. W. 779; Girardin v. Lampe, (1883) 58 Wis. 267, 16 N. W. 614;
Merchants Trust Co. v. Davis, (1930) 49 Idaho 494, 290 Pac. 383; In re
Buchner, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1913) 205 Fed. 454.
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tion with his purchase of the land, his purchase-money or part of
it being paid over to L for the satisfaction. An early federal
case 2 0 refused to protect Y in such case. Though he did not
make the note and it was not to be surrendered to him. yet he
must see to it that it is surrendered to B. He cannot rely simply
on L's record title to the mortgage and his delivered satisfaction,
though if he had bought the land only after the satisfaction
had been given and recorded, having no part in that transaction
himself, he would have been protected. Other courts have en-
forced this distinction, but some courts have apparently ignored
it .
2 
-
A combination of the two situations arises when 13. instead
of paying L in money, gives him a new note and mortgage to re-
fund the old ones. No serious difficulty ensues so long as I. re-
tains the new papers. He holds them as trustee for X.-at X'-
option; or, if X declines the new papers and enforces collection
of the old note from B, then B can require 1. to cancel and sur-
render the new note and mortgage.2- But if before discovery
L has endorsed and assigned the new note and mortgage in due
course to W (the old note still being in X's hands). divergent
results are reached. If L gave B a recorded satisfaction of the
old mortgage, then W obviously stands as a bona fide purchaser
of the land from B in reliance on the recorded satisfaction, like
Y in the preceding paragraph.22 If L gave no recorded satis-
faction, the new note and mortgage may still be treated as a pay-
ment of the old item and the problem worked out as though B
20 Windle v. Bonebrake, (C.C. Kan. 1885) 23 Fed. 165.
21y in such a case is B's grantee paying the mortgage debt: Cf. Note
17, ante. Cf. Foss v. Dullam, (1910) 111 Minn. 220. 125 N. XV. 820:
Henderson v. Pilgrim. (1858) 22 Tex. 464; Williams v. Jackson. (1882)
107 U. S. 478, 2 Sup. Ct. 814. 27 L. Ed. 529; Middlekauff v. Bell. (1922)
111 Kan. 206, 207 Pac. 184; Mayse v. Williams. (1907) 77 Kan. 813. 91
Pac. 795; Porter v. Ourada, (1897) 51 Neb. 510, 71 N. W. 52; Keohane
v. Smith, (1880) 97 Ill. 156; Livermore v. Maxwell, (1893) 87 Iowa 705,
55 N. V. 37; Quincy v. Giisbach, (1894) 92 Iowa 144. 60 N. W. 511;
Lewis v. Kirk, (1882) 28 Kan. 497; Bank v. Pease, (1898) 8 Kan. App.
573, 54 Pac. 1038; Bacon v. Van Schoonhoven, (1882) 87 N. Y. 446;
Assets Real. Co. v. Clark, (1912) 205 N. Y. 105. 98 N. E. 457; Snell v.
Margritz, (1902) 64 Neb. 6, 91 N. W. 274; Mulligan v. Snavely. (1929)
117 Neb. 765, 223 N. W. 8; Friend v. Yahr, (1905) 126 Wis. 291, 299-
301; 104 N. W. 997; Henniges v. Paschke, (1900) 9 N. D. 489, 84 N. W.
350; Holvick v. Black, (1928) 57 N. D. 270, 221 N. W. 71 ; Fed. Land Bank
v. Corinth Bank, (1926) 214 Ala. 146, 107 So. 88; Branscomb v. Fed. Land
Bank, (1926) 215 Ala. 242, 110 So. 42; Swift v. Bank of Washington,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1902) 114 Fed. 643; First Nat'l Bank Y. Baird. (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1905) 141 Fed. 862.2 21t is assumed that L took the new note and mortgage to hinself.
without X's knowledge or authority.2 Cf. ante, Notes 18 to 21.
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had paid L the amount of the old note in cash.24 If, as in Min-
nesota, such cash payment would have discharged the mortgage,
then X now may be held to have no lien on the land, though he
holds his note in due course. This means that B now owes the
money to both X and W, but W has the only mortgage security.
If B's cash payment to L would not have freed the land from
the mortgage as against X, then a refunding mortgage to L will
not do so. X will have his note, secured by first lien on the land.
P lainly then, the consideration for the new note and mortgage
has failed. This is only a personal defense to the note, not good
against W; but a jurisdiction where mortgages are non-negotiable
will award NV no lien on the land. Where the new mortgage is
held negotiable. NV will have a second lien on the land, subordi-
nate to X's first lien.
2 ,
After transferring the note to X in due course, L, instead of
giving B a recorded satisfaction, may take from him a convey-
ance of the land and later sell and convey (or mortgage) it over
to T. T supposing that he is getting it free from incumbrance.
T, if he bought simply "on the record," relied on the union of
the record title to the mortgage and the record title to the land
as having produced a merger. No merger took place in fact.
Until L conveyed over to T. the land in L's hands was subject to
the mortgage in favor of X. Could T safely rely on the record?
Inquiry of L presumably would have brought nothing to light,
but inquiry of B; ought to have disclosed the non-surrender of the
note to him. T was bound to know that it might have been trans-
ferred. Could he safely neglect the inquiry? Notwithstanding
our recording act,2 6 it may be deemed material whether 1. con-
veyed to T by warranty or by quitclaim deed. The latter would
have iinp'ied no representation by I. as to the nature or extent
"'Ct. ante, Notes 12 to 16. It is not an inevitable conclusion that a
refunding note and mortgage must be treated like payment of the old item in
cash; Cf. Rea v. Kelley, (Minn. 1931) 235 N. W. 910.
25Cf. Hunter v. Chase, (1923) 144 Md. 13, 123 Atl. 393: White v.
Kemberling. (1923) 114 Kan. 112, 216 Pac. 1087: Jacobs v. llester, (1925)
119 Kan. 661, 240 Pac. 952; Wood v. Swan. (1928) 206 Iowa 1198,
221 N. W. 791 ; Garrett v. Fernauld. (1912) 63 Fla. 434, 57 So. 671;
Quinbv v. Williams, (1893) 67 N. H. 489, 41 Atd. 862; Cent. Trust Co.
v. Stepanek. (1908) 138 Iowa 131, 115 N. W. 891: Robbins v. Larson,
(1897) 69 Minn. 436. 72 N. W. 456; Rea v. Kelley, (Minn. 1931) 235 N. W.910.
026"The fact that such first recorded conveyance is in the formi or
contains the terms of a deed of quitclaiin and release shall not iffect
the question of good faith of such subsequent purchaser, or be of itself
notice to him of any unrecorded conveyance of the same real estate."
Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 8226.
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of his title or the incumbrances against it, but if he conveyed by
full warranty deed he thereby explicitly stated to T that the land
was free from incumbrance. This should protect T as fully as if
he saw L's formal satisfaction of record. L recording a satis-
faction would assert nothing more than he asserts by his warranty
deed; and following out the line of thought, that T did not make
the note and it was not to be surrendered to him and he had no
part in the previous transaction between B and L, it would seem
not unfair to protect T's title against X. The Minnesota court
(as well as others) has so held, though there is some conflict of
authority."7 It is believed most courts would protect T if L had
given formal satisfaction in addition to taking conveyance from
B,'2 yet, as just suggested, if T may not rely on L's warranty
deed, how should he rely any better on L's satisfaction of the
mortgage, with no inquiry as to surrender of the note?
Greater difficulties come into view if we assume that after
endorsing" the note to X in due course L then assigns the mort-
gage to Z by formal, recorded assignment. Z paying value "in
good faith." -" If at this point the facts become known, B will
27The terms of B's conveyance to L may also be material. If T. buy-
ing from L, must find out whether L surrendered the note to B. then it
would seem all later grantees from T must repeat the inquiry, until the
statute of limitations can be relied on to have outlawed the debt. For
no later grantee is any better "bona fide purchaser on the record" than T
was. Cf. Watts v. Lundeen, (1925) 165 Minn. 300, 206 N. \V. 444; sed
cf. Bloomer v. Burke, (1904) 94 Minn. 15, 19, 101 N. W. 974. Cf. Purdy
v. Huntington, (1870) 42 N. Y. 334; Curtis v. Moore, (1896) 152 N. Y.
159, 46 N. E. 168; Matthews v. Jones, (1896) 47 Neb. 616. 66 N. W. o22:
Peterborough Say. Bank v. Pierce, (1898) 54 Neb. 712, 75 N. W. 20.
Ames v. Miller, (1902) 65 Neb. 204, .91 N. W. 250; Pritchard v. Kalamazoo
College, (1890) 82 Mich. 587, 47 N. W. 31; Ogle v. Turpin. (1882) 102
11. 148; Havighorst v. Bowen, (1905) 214 Ill. 90, 73 N. E. 402; Bank
of Ind. v. Anderson, (1863) 14 Iowa 544; Bowling v. Cook, (1874) 39
Iowa 200: Jenks v. Shaw, (1896) 99 Iowa 604, 612 et seq., 68 N. W. 900;
James v. Newman, (1910) 147 Iowa 574, 126 N. XVr. 781 ; Rollette Co. Bank
v. Hanlyn, (1921) 48 N. D. 72, 183 N. W. 260; Newman v. Fidelity Say.
Ass'n, (1912) 14 Ariz. 354, 128 Pac. 53; Donaldson v. Grant, (1897) 15
Utah 231, 49 Pac. 779; Wolcott v. Winchester, (1860) 15 Gray (Mass.i
461; Quimby v. Williams. (1893) 67 N. H. 489, 41 Ati. 862.
2SIn such case T obviously stands in the same position as Y in an
earlier paragraph (Cf. ante, Notes 18 to 21). He is a bona fide pur-
chaser under mesne conveyance from B.
29L to begin with has two instruments: the note. and the mortgage.
It is a fair question why anybody should be deemed a purchaser "in good
faith" and free from "negligence" (Cf. post, Note 38), who buys and
accepts delivery of either instrument without the other. However, pos-
session of the note is much more important than possession of the mort-
gage. And X, buying the note, may not even know that any mortgage
goes with it; then he can hardly be criticized for not getting possession
of it (sed cf. Franklin Say. Bank v. Colby, (1898) 105 Iowa 424, 75
N. W. 346.) But Z is almost always on notice that the mortgage secures a
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have to pay X; but, paying X, he can require Z to satisfy the
mortgage. This result will obtain, not only in Minnesota, by
reason of a mortgage's non-negotiability, but as well in jurisdic-
tions that hold mortgages negotiable. It flows from the primary
doctrine that the mortgage is merely incidental to the debt and is
not to be separated from it.3o X, unimpeachable holder of the
debt, is entitled to be paid; B duly paying the debt to its proper
holder, discharges the mortgage with the debt. Z has no rights
(except against L).' But reverse the chronology of these tran-
sactions: Suppose L first sold the mortgage to Z by formal,
recorded assignment, and later endorsed the note to X ini due
course. Z, paying value, of course, did not intentionally buy the
mortgage alone, as a "dry trust;" he meant to buy its beneficial
ownership.32  But that means the debt, and he failed to get
possession of the note. Did he not thereby run the same risk of a
later as of an earlier transfer of the note to X ?3 But on the
other hand, if (by recital in the note or by parol) X knew of the
mortgage when he bought the note, then ought not X to have
searched the record and found the earlier assignment to Z? This
suggestion would seem to impair the negotiability of a note
known to be secured by mortgage ;14 but good authority supports
the proposition that X in such case is not "buying negotiable
paper simpliciter" and is not entitled to prevail against Z.35 The
negotiable note. Occasionally Z buys the mortgage without having any
note delivered to him. Sometimes, however, L forges a copy of the note
and delivers it to Z, or fraudulently delivers some other note to him as the
mortgage note; or, L by some means regains possession of the true note
from X and then fraudulently delivers it to Z with the mortgage and an
assignment. In this last case Z of course may displace X as holder of
the note in due course,-e.g., if it was endorsed in blank.
3oCf. ante, Notes 1 and 2.
31 Cf. O'Mulcahy v. Holly, (1881) 28 Minn. 31, 8 N. W. 906; Wolcott
v. Winchester, (1860) 15 Gray (Mass.) 461; Syracuse Say. Bank v.
Merrick, (1905) 182 N. Y. 387, 75 N. E. 232; Kellogg v. Smith, (1862)
26 N. Y. 18; Byles v. Tome, (1873) 39 Md. 461; Quimby v. Williams,(1893) 67 N. H. 489, 493, 41 Ad. 862; Blunt v. Norris, (1877) 123 Mass.
55; Morris v. Bacon, (1877) 123 Mass. 58; Adler v. Newell, (1895) 109
Cal. 42, 41 Pac. 799; Bunker v. Int. Harv. Co., (1910) 148 Iowa 708, 127
N. W. 1016.
32The most usual form of mortgage assignment purports to assign
the mortgage, "together with the indebtedness thereby secured."33 1t sometimes happens that Z did get the note with the mortgage,
but later L by some means re-possesses himself of the note and transfers
it to X in due course. Cf. ante, Note 29.
34Cf. ante, Note 6.
85 Murphy v. Barnard, (1894) 162 Mass. 72, 38 N. E. 29. Sed ef.
Foster v. Augustana College, (1923) 92 Okla. 96, 218 Pac. 335 (holding
that X will prevail vs. Z, and that Z has no rights in either the note or the
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mortgage and assignment being conveyances within the recording
acts, X buys subject to the record. These decisions award Z the
beneficial ownership of the mortgage, not simply its technical
"legal title." Z is entitled to be paid, at least out of the land or
its proceeds. What of X's position; has he a personal action
against B? If so, the note and mortgage have been effectually
severed; B must pay twice, or pay once and lose his land be-
sides; yet B had no part or lot in any of the transactions (after
he gave the note and mortgage) that produced this result. But
that is not believed to be the meaning of the decisions. They
often leave this point obscure, because the mortgagor commonly
defaults in the litigation and so his rights and obligations are not
carefully considered. But in Al twphy v. Barnard,'7 at least,
the mortgagor was an active party to the litigation, and the opinion
evidently means that his obligation is to pay Z alone. The
opinions discuss the matter in terms of "negligence.""8  Z was
negligent in buying the claim without getting and keeping the
note, but with his assignment on record no trouble would have
ensued had X not afterward bought the note (known to be
secured) without examining the mortgage records. But this
negligence can be fastened on X only when he knew of the
mortgage. If he bought the note as a plain, unsecured note,
how c*an his position as a holder in due course be attacked? What
then is the position of Z, and B? No case has been found
squarely on this situation; but it is submitted the court should
protect B against Z in such a case, and that on B's paying X the
mortgage). Cf. Stein -v. Sullivan, (1879) 31 N. J. Eq. 409; Hewell v.
Coulbourn, (1880) 54 Md. 59; Strong Y. Jackson, (1877) 123 Mass. 60;
Porter v. King, (D.C. Pa. 1880) 1 Fed. 755; Kernohan v. Manss Bros.,
(1895) 53 Ohio St. 118, 41 N. E. 258. Cf. (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAw
REVIEW 337, 347.
36Cf. Robbins v. Larson, (1897) 69 Minn. 436, 72 N. V. 456, where
the court frankly intimated the decision might have been different if the
mortgagor had contested the case.
37(1894) 162 Mass. 72, 38 N. E. 29.
38"Negligence" in this connection obviously does not mean just what
it means, e.g., in personal injury law. There it means tortious conduct.
imposing on the negligent party the obligation to pay damages. But
neither X nor Z here has done anything tortious. Their "negligence"
was rather what the chancellors meant by "laches." Precisely, it means
that by doing as they did they ran some risk of losing their rights,
which they would not have run had they done differently. In Hohfeldian
discourse, they subjected themselves to a "liability." One can hardly be
deemed negligent in the ordinary sense who is deceived by a skilful
forgery (Cf. ante, Note 29) ; but, of course, one who buys a forged
note acquires nothing. Cf. Note 13, ante.
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mortgage should be cancelled. Z was plainly negligent in not
getting and keeping the note), and because of that B now must
pay X, an innocent holder of the note; but no negligence can
possibly be charged against B unless it be boldly asserted that he
was negligent in giving his negotiable note with a mortgage in
the first place."'
Finally, suppose that instead of assigning the unforeclosed
mortgage to Z, L forecloses the mortgage (either before or
after transferring the note to X) and then conveys the land to
S, who buys purely "on the record." S as a purchaser of the
land after foreclosure stands very differently from Z, as assignee
of the unforeclosed mortgage.40 Z buying the unforeclosed mort-
gage was negligent in not obtaining and retaining the note; but
S buying the foreclosed land seems under no burden to see or
ask about the note. Buyers of land that has been foreclosed
on do not usually do so. Has he then bought valid title to the
land ?
4 1
When X bought the note, he bought also the beneficial interest
in the mortgage.4 2  But without formal, recorded assignment to
him he could not foreclose it by advertisement. L was the only
party competent to do that.41 Of course L could rightfully fore-
close only on B's default and at X's request. But suppose he
did it without X's request or knowledge. Has such a foreclosure
39An early New York or New England judge (to the writer's regret,
the citation has been lost) deplored the then new-fangled custom of giving
a negotiable note with a mortgage. The older practice had been to give
a non-negotiable bond. But it is surely too late now to stigmatize giving
a negotiable note with a mortgage as "negligent" or in any degree un-
businesslike. It is not so far-fetched to suggest that B might be deened
negligent in not seeing to it that his note referred to the mortgage, so
as to bring into play the doctrine of the cases cited under Note 35 (ante).
Notes that are secured not uncommonly do disclose the fact. But not al-
ways; and B would scarcely find himself able to insist upon it, if 1.
required a note plain on its face. "The borrower is servant to the lender."
40Cf. ante, Notes 14 and 15. The "lien States" regard an unfore-
closed mortgage as a chose in action; but after foreclosure a purchaser
is dealing with the title to the land, even before expiration of redcnm-
tion: Cf. Pioneer Ass'n v. Farnham, (1892) 50 Minn. 315. 52 N. W.
897; Berthold v. Holman, (1867) 12 Minn. 335 (Gil. 221): Whitney
v. Huntington, (1886) 34 Minn. 458, 26 N. W. 631: Marshall & III-ley
Bank v. Cady, (1899) 76 Minn. 112, 78 N. W. 978: Grady v. First
Securities Co., (1930) 179 Minn. 571, 229 N. W. 874.
41Cf. ante, Note 19.
42Cf. ante, Notes 1, 2, 10, 11.
43Cf. Dick v. Moon, (1879) 26 Minn. 309, 4 N. W. 39; Wilson v.
Eigenbrodt. (1882) 30 Minn. 4, 13 N. W. 907; Solberg v. Wright, (1885)
33 Minn. 224, 22 N. W. 381; Dunning v. McDonald, (1893) 54 Minn. 1. 55
N. W. 864; Hathorn v. Butler, (1898) 73 Minn. 15, 74 N. W. 743.
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any validity? In Minnesota, at least, apparently it has." So
long as L retains title to the land, no harm has been done. He
will be held trustee of it for X; or, if X, declining the land,
should enforce the note against B, then L could be made to re-
convey the land to B, or the foreclosure be annulled by decree.'4
But after L has conveyed the land to S, apparently S cannot be
made constructive trustee, but will hold the land for his own
benefit.4 6 The foreclosure then was valid and binding on B,
though X does not get the benefit of it. B has lost his land to
S. Does he also owe X the money? Huitink v. Thompson'1
was contested only between X and S; the mortgagor defaulted,
and hence his rights were not adjudicated.4' As usual, the opinion
proceeds on the ground of negligence. But in that case X bought
the note with knowledge of the mortgage and deliberately re-
frained from recording a formal assignment. Hence it was said
he left "apparent title" to the mortgage in L, with the possibility
of the foreclosure and conveyance to S. The same negligence
might well have defeated his right to recover the money from
B.4 9  But suppose X had bought the note in ignorance of the
mortgage: Then apparently his right to recover front B as a holder
in due course could not be defeated. Must B be held then also
to have lost the land to S? In a contest between X and S it is
well enough to talk of X's negligence, but the gist of S's position
against B is that he bought the land "on the record" with no
burden of making parol inquiry about the note. How i that
position affected by X's conduct, negligent or otherwise?
But what has B done or omitted to subject himself to the loss
of the land to S and the money to X ? In Merchant v. IWoods-0
B had paid L but had failed to have the note surrendered or to
record a formal satisfaction, and it was said he thereby left I.
"apparently authorized" to foreclose. Wherever the foreclosure
took place after maturity, or was based on B's actual default,
44CL Palmer v. Bates, (1876) 22 inn. 532; Merchant v. Woods.
(1881) 27 'Minn. 396, 7 N. W. 826; Huitink v. Thompson. (1905) 95
Minn. 392, 104 N. W. 237; (semble) Hathorn v. Butler. (1898) 73 Minn.
15. 74 N. W. 743.
4-"Meeker Co. Bank v. Young. (1892) 51 Minn. 254, 53 N. W. 630.
4cThat is the apparent effect of the Minnesota cases cited under Note
44. ante.
47(1905) 95 Minn. 392. 104 N. W. 237.
4SThis is learned from the paperbook: the published report dots not
disclose the fact.
"Cf. ante. Notes 35 to 37.0(1881) 27 Minn. 396. 7 N. V. 826. Cf. ante. Note 44.
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it may be urged B was negligent; he must have anticipated fore-
closure and should have learned whether L was conducting it
with authority. But under an acceleration clause foreclosure by
advertisement can be conducted even though the debtor is in no
actual default, and it can be so conducted, and redemption expire,
without coming to B's knowledge at all. "' Is it nevertheless valid
and binding on B, and on X, once title under the foreclosure has
come to S? It is one thing to say that by defaulting, or paying
without recording a satisfaction, B gives L apparent authority
to foreclose. But by the very giving of the mortgage with power
of sale does he give L apparent authority to foreclose, default
or no default ? 2 True, no purchaser in S's position, buying
land whose title deraigns through a foreclosure, takes note of the
fact that it was held under an acceleration clause and therefore
inquires whether the claimed default was actual. But must B, hav-
ing given a mortgage with power of sale and acceleration clause,
thereafter mount continuous guard at the register of (leeds' office
to see that no foreclosure is spread on record based on a fictitious
default? It means just that, to hold that S buying under such
a foreclosure acquires an indefeasible title2 3 If X bought the
5'The Minnesota statute does not require the foreclosure notice issued
under power of sale even to state explicity that default has occurred, though
it commonly does so: Minn. G. S. 1923, secs. 9603, 9605; cf. Fowler v.
Woodward. (1880) 26 Minn. 347, 4 N. W. 23; Trafton v. Cornell, (1895)
62 Minn. 442, 64 N. W. 1148; West v. Berg, (1896) 66 Minn. 287, 68
N. W. 1077. And the notice need not be served on the mortgagor or ever
come to his actual notice unless he happens also to occupy the premises
personally. If they are vacant, the notice need not be actually served on
anybody. Minn. G. S. 1923, secs. 9604, 9618 (2). In Huitink v. Thompson,
(1905) 95 Minn. 392, 104 'N. W. 237, the foreclosure was conducted on
such an "affidavit of vacancy," and neither the report nor the paperbook
makes it clear that the mortgagor either knew of the foreclosure or had
committed any default at that time.
52Cf. Bradford Say. Bank v. Crippen, (1901) 63 Neb. 210, 88
N. W. 166, where foreclosure by action had been brought in the name of
a nominal plaintiff who neither owned nor had possession of the note
or mortgage, and decree had been obtained although it is said the debtor
was not actually in default at all. The report does not disclose whether
the decree was based on a contest or on the mortgagor's non-appearance.
Cf. Kenney v. Bank, (1898) 12 Colo. App. 24, 54 Pac. 404 (with the note
transferred to X, the mortgage in L's hands becomes in effect a trust
deed) ; Smith v. Bradford, (S.D. 1929) 228 N. W. 466; Merrill v. Luce,
(1894) 6 S. D. 354, 61 N. W. 43.
53If B knew of the foreclosure and the sale was for the full amount,
thus purporting to satisfy the debt, it seems not impertinent to suggest
that he ought to demand that his note be surrendered to him. He would
thereby speedily learn of its previous transfer to X. If the foreclosure
was held under an acceleration clause, it is possible for the note to get
into the hands of a holder in due course after the foreclosure, and by
requiring its surrender at the sale B would avoid that risk. In Meeker Co.
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note in due course and with no knowledge of the mortgage, so
that he is an unassailable holder in due course, and if S buying
the foreclosure title is absolved from any duty of parol inquiry
as to the note or actual default by B, then B by the very giving
of his negotiable note and mortgage (without seeing to it that the
note refers to the mortgage) subjects himself to this hazard of
forfeiture.
No case has been found that confronted the court with this
extreme situation. If one ever does arise, it is not believed the
court will forfeit B's land to S and also make him pay the money
to X, and the further suggestion is ventured that S is the one
who should lose. After all, the purchaser of real estate "on the
record" necessarily runs many risks,-of forged deeds, e.g., of
dower rights of undisclosed spouses, and the like--and it were
better to add the risk of having bought under a foreclosure
which, though fair on its face and not a forgery, was neverthe-
less unauthorized and void, than to forfeit B's property when he
has done nothing (except to give his "plain" negotiable note and
mortgage) to incur such danger. In Huitink V'. Thompson"'
the mortgagor's default in the litigation, and the vagueness of
the appellate record as to the actuality of his default on the
mortgage or his knowledge of the foreclosure enabled the court
to avoid giving his position thorough consideration. But by the
same token it is submitted the apparent doctrine of that case
need not be pushed to the last extremity. That case, and the
other Minnesota cases cited5 are extreme enough, however severe-
ly limited to their "exact facts."
One or two practical suggestions emerge. A mortgagor should
see to it, if he can, that his note recites the existence of the
mortgage. And, to attorneys engaged in foreclosure practice:
As an officer of court and a minister of justice an attorney is
recreant who forecloses a mortgage without requiring delivery
Bank v. Young, (1892) 51 Minn. 254, 53 N. W. 630, the note was so
transferred after the foreclosure. Yet if it is negligent for B not to
procure surrender of his note on foreclosure, the opinion is hazarded that
negligence is the all but uniform custom in Minnesota. It is not believed
that attorneys conducting foreclosure by advertisement usually surrender
the note to the debtor after the sale. They commonly return it to their
client, the foreclosing creditor, or else keep it in their own files. But
if B did not know of the foreclosure and was not in default he cannot
possibly be deemed negligent in not demanding his note before its maturity.
Cf. post, Notes 56, 57.54(1905) 95 Minn. 392, 104 N. W. 237. Ante, Note 44.55At Note 44, ante.
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of the note to him. 6 And after foreclosure he should not simply
return the note to his client; certainly not without cancelling it
so that it cannot be put in further circulation. Otherwise, he
ought to see to it that it is surrendered to the debtor.57
-Cf. ante, Note 53. In Bradford Say. Bank v. Crippen, (1901) 63
Neb. 210, 88 N. NV. 166, the foreclosure was conducted and findings made
that plaintiff owned the note and mortgage, when that finding was false
and the papers apparently were not produced in court. It would seem this
could not have happened if the foreclosing attorney had done his duty.57Cf. ante, Note 53. Even if the note is past-due at the time of fore-
closure, it still may be put later into the hands of one who will claim to
have bought it before maturity, thus entailing the hazard and expense
of litigation.
